In case Iraq Fails, A Contingency Plan
The Government of Iraq appears weaker and less capable each passing month and the prospects for its failure, and therefore the failure of American policy, should be examined along with contingency plans in case it does.
One potential solution that I've been mulling over basically boils down to "picking sides." In essence, at some point we would cease being a pseudo neutral player in Iraq and choose a group or faction to explicitly support above all others. Similar to what we did many times in South America, we'd feed this group weapons and training and help it dominate adversaries and either crush or force them to negotiate on favorable terms. This could be done with little actual American military power, provided preparations are made in advance. This course of action has the potential to give us a strong and reliable proxy to help protect our interests in the region and Iraq should the current government fail.
The downsides are, however, many. Although I see this course of action taking place in the context of an obvious or imminent demise of the Iraqi government, it would still be viewed as a complete and blatantly hypocritical reversal of our policy of “promoting Democracy” in the Middle East. The consequential damage to American prestige and influence must be weighed carefully. Additionally, there are ethical issues, obviously, and they would be exacerbated by ubiquitous media coverage that did not exist in places like El Salvador and Chile. Insurgent warfare is an ugly business and if America supports a particular faction then many will view the US as culpable in whatever crimes that faction will inevitably commit, leading to reduced domestic US and international support among other negative consequences. The worst possible consequence is our proxy might lose to a competing faction. This eventuality would not only diminish our influence throughout the region and increase the power and prestige of our enemies, but could necessitate another military intervention by the US itself. There are other negative consequences as well, mostly hidden, that we must try to take into account before formulating this type of contingency policy.
A vital question becomes, who do we support and pick as our proxy force? At first the Kurds may appear to be the obvious choice, but they bring several significant downsides in addition to those discussed above. First, there is the danger they may be more interested in using us to create a greater Kurdistan which includes parts of Turkey and Iran. Our ally Turkey would be livid and promotion of the Kurds as the dominant group would ensure both Turkey and Iran would intervene to prevent Kurd adventurism. Second, the Kurds have carved out their own bit of autonomy in the north and their ability and willingness to seize and control Arab Iraqi centers of gravity (like Baghdad) in the central and southern portions of the country are suspect at best. One thing that Iraqi Arab Shia’s and Sunni’s can agree on is that they would never live under Kurdish rule. So, overall, it’s better to leave the Kurds to prosper in limited autonomy and institutionalize the existing condition of a limited de facto Kurdish state.
A second option is to support a moderate Shia group or tribe from central Iraq. Unfortunately, no group that I know of has an adequate base of power, but more importantly, a charismatic and dynamic leader with a penchant for dictatorial power. I have admittedly spent little time on this area of research, so such a unique person, able to rise and control a major moderate group or coalition, may exist. A moderate Shia dictatorship would assuage the Iranians somewhat, since they are more interested in a friendly stable neighbor in Iraq than in molding it into Iran’s image of Islamic revolution. Still, given the wide range of Shia groups and the dominance of anti-American elements like Sadr, it’s difficult to find an adequate Shia proxy group. We must keep in mind though, that power is relative and marginal groups like Tikriti Baathists and Bolsheviks have risen from obscurity to rule nations and empires. For this reason, we should keep an eye on the Shia community and look for leaders and groups with the potential and interest in furthering American goals as well as their own.
My final option, which I consider the best and most likely, is a US-sponsored Iraqi military coup. This is an eventuality we could start working toward now, since our position as the primary trainer and supplier of Iraqi military and police forces gives us an exceptional ability to work toward building and developing the necessary force and, more importantly, leadership, to stage a coup and deal with the consequences. The top leadership would be very important, as a competent, charismatic and politically astute (as well as secular or moderately religious) person would be required to suppress sectarian divisions in the armed force he controls. Pakistan’s Musharraf would be a good model, or perhaps someone like General Hamdami from Saddam’s old Army.
A military coup model may be the best option we have for a few reasons. First, work on building a professional Army needed for a successful coup does not mean we need to immediately give up hope on our current policy of democratization. In this regard the military coup option becomes the best from a contingency-planning standpoint because the current Iraqi government will also need a capable military to succeed if it hopes to unite the country and defend its borders. However, if the government does fail, by developing a pro-American military leadership and a well supplied and adequately trained force the military could step in and take over. Second, a military coup could make a potential (and likely) civil war shorter because the military should have an advantage in equipment, training and organization. Third, since the military is already part of the government, it would probably be easier to gain international recognition for it than someone like Sadr or a fanatical religious organization like the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The primary problem is that a successful military coup would require both a core of competent leadership combined with an adequate and loyal force. As it stands now, such a force does not exist, but it could with proper vetting and training, especially if we start now.
Whoever is chosen, the result could be several years, at least, of bloody civil war and the end of any hope for democracy in Iraq through the medium term. Even so, a shorter, more violent and one-sided civil war may be preferable in the long run to an Afghan-style civil war that consumes generations and destroys all political and social institutions above the tribal level. This brings us back to the ethical issue again – Overall, I believe a short, bloody civil war instigated and guided partly through American action is ethically preferable to the costs of inaction, whose poster-children are Afghanistan and Rwanda. As unpalatable as it might be, we may eventually be forced by circumstance to choose sides and pick proxy to defend our interests and those of our allies. We need to prepare for this contingency now.
