Intelligence Studies: Analyzing the "Yes Men" Effect in Closed Regimes

This post is the first of what I hope to be many on topics regarding intelligence analysis.  It will likely appeal only to the most hardened intel geek, but hopefully laymen will find it interesting.  Without further adieu, the "yes men" effect:

The desire to limit or hide bad information from superiors is a natural human tendency.  In closed regimes, however, it often becomes standard operating procedure.  Despots historically do not take bad news well, especially when it reflects poorly on them personally, and are prone to “kill the messenger.”  As a result, over time, authoritarian regimes can develop a “Yes Man” mentality around the principal leader or leaders as underlings attempt to avoid the very real and sometimes deadly consequences of failure or delivering bad news.  This is a condition endemic in closed and authoritarian regimes and generally increases in intensity with the level of paranoia and despotism by the leadership.

Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler are two parallel examples that demonstrate the principle.  As each became more paranoid and delusional over time, they also became increasingly unfriendly to bad news and sound contrary viewpoints and advice.  Their psychology of individual superiority combined with a growing reluctance by advisors to give honest advice had the effect of heightening the perception of their own intellectual and analytical superiority.   As time passed, both Saddam and Hitler increasingly believed that everyone around them was ignorant and stupid.  This effect was continually reinforced by the collective effects of growing personal isolation and the bevy of “yes men” and sycophants who either curried favor or were rightly afraid to question their leader’s judgment. The result for Hitler and Saddam was that near the end of their regimes, little truthful reporting made it to their ears and most of their decisions were made based using their own flawed self-importance and equally flawed information.  For Saddam’s regime it got to the point where the leadership believed the completely and comically  bogus reporting of their own Information Minister, nicknamed “Baghdad Bob.” (Yes, it's hard to believe, but true.  Not until US tanks rolled through Baghdad did the reality of the situation finally dawn on Saddam and his close advisers.)  Stalin was similarly handicapped, but was wise enough to leave most operational military matters to professional Generals after many poor decisions following the German invasion in 1941.  Both Stalin and Saddam forbade their intelligence functions from providing foreign political analysis because they felt, as political leaders, they were the "experts" and therefore more qualified to judge political matters.  However a combination of inaccurate regime reporting, ignorance of other political leaders, and paranoia-infused cognitive bias ensured that both would horribly miscalculate the intent of foreign political leaders.

The “Yes Man” phenomenon presents interesting challenges to intelligence evaluation and analysis.  The degree to which information flow in a closed regime is affected by dishonest reporting must be considered when evaluating intelligence – particularly intelligence that is contradictory.  Communications and Human intelligence are particularly susceptible to spurious data from dishonest reporting because they can directly tap the information flow within a regime. As a result, the accuracy of information from such direct access must be carefully evaluated to determine not only the validity of the information, but also the extent and scope of reporting dishonesty. 
With a robust collection plan, it’s possible to validate direct access intelligence by comparing it to other collected intelligence.  For example, if a communication intercept for a fighter wing reports a certain level of readiness or the completion of operational activities, that information can be verified with other sources such as imagery.  If the communications intercept conflicted with other sources, then that could be an indication that lower echelons are purposely lying to the upper echelons of the regime. A downside to this kind of analysis is that close coordination between different collection assets and methods is necessary to provide analysts with sufficient data to make an accurate analytical judgment.  Analysts and collection managers will have to prioritize and coordinate collection with the specific goal of obtaining regime reporting, ideally at multiple levels of the hierarchy, and comparing it with other intelligence collected for the purpose of evaluating regime reporting.  However, the amount of collection resources required to provide the necessary data may be unrealistic in light of competing requirements and the very real limitations of collecting against closed regimes.  If the necessary collection cannot be supported, then analysts should view direct access intelligence data with additional skepticism if it originates in a closed or authoritarian regime.

Another potential problem is identifying where in the chain-of-command the dishonest reporting occurs.  Identification and analysis of the phenomenon will be easier if dishonesty is endemic at all levels or echelons since there are more opportunities for US assets to collect the report as it flows up the heirachy.  If regime reporting is largely accurate until the information hits the regime’s inner circle, then the phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine because of fewer collection opportunities.

Knowledge of reporting accuracy in a regime has many implications for policy and decision-makers.  Using Saddam as an example, a regime leader may believe that his military is more powerful than it truly is, which could affect his calculus for going to war or confronting the United States.  Readiness reports that reached Saddam were never accurate and overstated Iraqi military capabilities.  When combined with Saddam's delusions about the inherent superiority of Arab fighters, among others, he grossly overestimated Iraq's military strength prior to OIF. 

Knowledge of the existence and extent of the "yes man" phenomenon inside a regime affords opportunities for exploitation through psychological and information operations which could serve to manipulate the regime or destabilize it.  Most important, however, is that analysts and policymakers would be better able to determine assumptions the insulated regime leadership use to make critical decisions - hopefully resulting in better predictive analysis.

Accurate analysis of closed regimes is critical for US strategic warning and foreign policy.  Many historic strategic warning failures have at least some roots in the failure to appreciate information flow within and reporting within a regime.  Successful mitigation of adversaries like North Korea, Iran, Syria and a host of other authoritarian regimes will be impossible unless analysts understand internal regime decision processes, which are directly influenced by regime reporting.  The effects of miscalculations are potentially monumental if history is used as a guide.  All analysts should view direct access intelligence data with additional skepticism and advocate for additional collection resources to validate it.  Otherwise, the United States will likely make significant strategic mistakes when dealing with closed regimes in the future.

Comments

[MK]

with Rumsfelds veto on counterarguments in mind, I cant help but notice that this analysis also sums up the Iraq-effort.

[MK]

Read Kurt Vonnegut? The greatest american ever. He survived Dresden.

[MG]

What about when "intelligence" is "fixed around the policy" through intense political pressure applied directly to the "analysts" and through the establishment of parallel activities which directly disseminate selected, unvetted and distorted "intelligence" (aka disinformation) for purposes of internal and external indoctrination and propaganda? That is a very different model than the "yes man" phenomenon you talk about. It is not "groupthink." It is criminality in office.