Neighborhood Containment - A Security Strategy for Iraq

This post is in response to Dave Shuler’s Blogging Colloquium on “Directions for Iraq.”  I’m honored to participate in a creative, open-minded and, most of all, reasoned discussion of options on Iraq.

I will begin with a short synopsis of my credentials.  I served as an intelligence analyst with the US Navy and Air force for over 15 years.  During that time I had a broad range of experience, mostly concentrated on the Persian-Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean littoral. My primary expertise was in support to military planning and conventional and unconventional threat analysis.

The problems and potential solutions to the current mess in Iraq are certainly complex and immense in scope.  To start with, I’ll outline the broad strategy I believe will lead to success.  For the purposes of this post and discussion, I will call it the “Neighborhood Containment” (NC) strategy.  It’s rooted in established counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, so most, if not all, the ideas I present here are not new.  I’m simply packaging a strategy based on COIN doctrine tailored to present-day Iraq. 

Interestingly, the US Army and Marine Corp just published a new manual for US Military COIN doctrine (13mb PDF). I haven’t read the entire 282 page document yet (I did read the draft published over the summer), but a quick examination confirms that the US military is not following many COIN principles listed in the manual and is making notable and identifiable mistakes in Iraq by applying conventional military thinking to an unconventional insurgent war.  I highly recommend everyone reading this post at least read the forward and introduction.  I may write an analytical post comparing our current operations with those laid out in the COIN manual in the future.

Before my specific prescription I think it’s important to identify some of the assumptions that underlie my reasoning.  I’ll say at the start that these assumptions are not without controversy and certainly are not secure from intellectual attack. Here they are in rough order of importance:

1. The ultimate solution to the discord in Iraq is a political solution, not a military one.  However, in the current environment, a political solution is not possible until security is improved.  I place security over other factors, such as political freedom and economics based, in part, on Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.  Although somewhat flawed and representing western cultural bias, Maslow’s theory, I believe, shows personal security from violence as the preeminent need of the average Iraqi.
2. A political solution that keeps Iraq intact requires the Iraqi government hold the loyalty of a majority of the population.
3. The neighborhood containment strategy must (and hopefully would) be part of a larger, coordinated, and comprehensive COIN strategy.  COIN, when done correctly, is probably the most complex and multidisciplinary form of warfare that exists.  As a corollary, policy makers must understand the basic limitations of US military forces (particularly conventional) in a COIN environment.  In my estimation, a majority of Congressional Representatives and Senators along with key leaders in the Executive (along with a majority of the public) are ignorant of these limitations.  Sadly, many in the military are as well.
4. Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict, a civil war, and/or partition of Iraq is not inevitable.
5. There are no quick solutions – the effort will require perhaps a decade or two of significant US involvement. However, this does not necessarily mean significant US military involvement for the entire period.

The basic idea behind the Neighborhood Containment strategy is to grow security in Iraq in pieces and phases at the local level, one neighborhood at a time.  To date, policy makers and the military have concentrated on the “hot spot” du jour by moving forces around in what many have derided as a “whack-a-mole” COIN strategy.  More recently, some have begun to advocate a “clear and hold” strategy which is similar to, but shallower, than my NC strategy.  NC is a phased strategy:

Phase I – Identification: NC starts with identifying a neighborhood based on geographic, cultural, ethnic, tribal and/or sectarian boundaries and conditions, among other factors.

Phase  II – Isolation: Once a candidate neighborhood is identified, the next phase uses US and Iraqi forces to isolate it from the rest of the country.  Initially, US forces with Iraqis embedded would conduct the cordon, establish checkpoints and maintain security around the perimeter.  Once accomplished, additional US and Iraqi forces would conduct aggressive patrolling in the zone to establish security, root out insurgents, and begin developing intelligence networks to uncover hidden insurgent cells.  As much as practicable, operations should have an Iraqi face, and, as the neighborhood is pacified over time, control should be transitioned completely over to Iraqi forces.  Isolation is particularly important because it limits insurgent resupply, movement and the ability to conduct attacks.

Phase III – Essential Services and Population Control: Once a basic level of security is achieved (it’s important to note that complete security will take time and won't be fully achieved until phase V), then Iraqi government agencies, most likely assisted by international organizations and NGO’s, will move in to establish essential services.  Again, as much as possible, these operations should have an Iraqi face to garner popular support for the government.  Concurrently, the Iraqi government would conduct a census and residents would be required to obtain a new, forge-proof national identification card (the current card is inadequate and easily forged).  This new ID is another measure to limit insurgent movement and resupply by monitoring and controlling movement into and out of the neighborhood zone.

Phase IV – Increase Government control:  Depending upon circumstances and the depth of insurgent activity in the neighborhood, this phase could last anywhere from perhaps a year to a decade.  During this phase, the Iraqi government moves to establish complete control of the zone by expanding beyond basic needs and essential services.  Most importantly, a viable police force is trained, equipped and deployed to maintain everyday security.  Ideally the force would be drawn from vetted residents of the neighborhood.  As the police force establishes control, coalition and federal Iraqi forces would gradually withdraw. Additionally, perimeter security would be gradually eased to adjoining neighborhoods which are in stage IV or V, but would be maintained between any neighborhoods not yet part of the NC program.

Phase V – Return to Normalcy: This phase represents the end of the insurgency in the neighborhood as a serious threat and the return of normalcy in everyday life. Any remaining coalition or Iraqi federal forces would be withdrawn and the security perimeter would be disestablished between other Phase V neighborhoods.

That’s the plan in a nutshell. The concept has several advantages:

First, if the program demonstrates success with the initial “proof of concept” neighborhoods, then others would likely want to join the program.  Not only does this grant internal legitimacy to the Iraqi government, but it also puts it at an advantage since it can decide which neighborhoods would join the program next thereby giving it a measure of negotiating power with local leaders.  People will gradually demand to join the program because of its security and essential service benefits and they will pressure their local leaders to negotiate and join the government fold.  Reliable electricity, water and other critical services would be a powerful inducement to the average Iraqi, to say nothing of improved security.

Secondly, it will limit insurgent activity, movement and operational freedom through tight control of the population.  Additionally, success will negate insurgent propaganda (our media operations currently suck compared to the insurgent) as more neighborhoods join and expand.  The hard-core insurgent areas will increasingly be physically, politically, economically, and socially isolated.

Thirdly, the plan makes success easier by scaling down operations to manageable level.  For three years now, the US has tried a national haphazard approach that overreached and failed.  In many ways, it resembled the old military axiom, “If you try to defend everything, you end up defending nothing.”  Concentrating on small areas first, then scaling and expanding the operation is a smarter way to go for a whole host of reasons.

Of course, there are downsides.  One is that US Forces will have to be more engaged, and therefore more vulnerable – particularly during the initial stages.  Overcoming the current force-protection “fobbit” attitude of commanders will be difficult.  Additionally, many US forces will require additional training prior to deployment, primarily in COIN operations.  Although US forces have improved a lot over the past several years, the conventional forces still largely approach the insurgent problem with conventional attitudes and tactics. There are, I’m sure, many other problems and potential pitfalls with this strategy, but I will leave those to critics to detail.

Finally, I'll post a few excellent links on COIN and Iraq:

• "Winning Wars" by a recently retired Colonel (pdf).
• "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency" by an NPS professor (pdf).
• "In a Volatile Region in Iraq, the US Military Takes Two Paths" Excellent WAPO article demonstrating conventional vs unconventional COIN operations.

Comments

[matoko-chan]

very perceptive analysis. local oilspots and "growing security" fits well into the general simulated annealing model i proposed for dave. ;)
did you see this piece dave linked, Knowing the Enemy?
"trusted networks" from the Manual versus dark networks, another good local strategy.

[matoko-chan]

uh oh.
my links dont show.
i was referring to this
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/061218fa_fact2
and this old wretchard piece on dark networks

http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/2004/09/dark-networks-vladis-krebs-has-case.html

[Andy]

Matoko-chan,

Thanks for your comments and links, those are excellent.

[Ken Hoop]

http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IB10Ak06.html

There is no solution for Iraq other than that provided by the likes of Dennis Kucinich-defund the war and get out. But Asia Times, as today, often has incisive pieces if you wish to follow the debacle
as you consider future harbingers of con tinued quagmire.

[MK]

Interesting and intelligent solution. Seems obvious that you should have done this three 1/2 years ago, the question now is wether the process has gone too far for phase 2 to be effective. The underlying sociological assumption of Maslow rules out the factor of hate/bloodrevenge/honour that is so prevalent.

Just a comment, btw: Isolation, or if I want to be nasty, ghettofication, of areas is a tactic that can easily backfire. Fallujah proved, I think, that matters easily slip out of hand and you end up creating symbols of resistance instead. Thats were Phase 1 comes into interaction with phase 3, in that the "Iraqi face" must be approved by local forces in order to gain legitimacy. If you can achieve that, to make the death-squad ghost go away and re-establish a rule of law, you still have a chance.

[Andy]

MK,

Thanks for your comments.

This strategy is probably not useful at this point now that the surge is ongoing. It was an attempt to address the problem of too few troops fighting CI in a large city. There are other problems with it as well. John Robb over at Global Guerrillas notes that partitioning a city has significant consequences to the local economy.