How to Talk to Iran and Syria

Much poo-poo has been made about the recent ISG report that gives so-called “expert” recommendations on what to do next in Iraq.  The quality of the recommendations vary widely, in my view.  Undoubtedly the most controversial is the recommendation to engage Syria and Iran in talks to somehow get their help in securing Iraq.  Rick Moran and many other notable bloggers on the right have roundly, and not without justification, criticized talks with those two despotic regimes.  However, talks could be productive, even if they only serve to make a few things clear to Iran and Syria and ensure they know our position.  Public diplomacy is often misinterpreted, so private talks will always have value in dispelling misperception by the other side.

In a perfect world I would have preferred engaging Iran and Syria much earlier - right after Baghdad fell in 2003.  Negotiations with Iran and Syria at that time would have given us comparative strength, especially considering we had already engaged Iran similarly after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Syria numerous times including the First Gulf War.  Now, however, Iran and Syria perceive the US position as considerably weakened and they would be hard-pressed to accede to any US demands even though neither country desires civil war and an unstable neighbor in Iraq.  There is still room, however, for influence and I believe that laying some of our cards out on the table for Syria and particularly Iran to ponder would probably be beneficial to us in the long run.

In order to effectively convince Iran and Syria to, at the very least, not interfere in Iraq, they must be convinced that it’s in their interest.  To achieve that, we need to show Syria and Iran what consequences they would face should the US fail in Iraq due to their malfeasance. 

To start off with, I would not make idle threats about invasion or airstrikes or direct military action against Iran or Syria.  Both of these countries know that such threats are largely hollow.  Our leaders are, I trust, wise enough to know that Iraq is not worth starting a large regional war over unless there is a clear and unmitigated cassis belli.  Syria and Iran are both smart enough to not cross that line.  With that said, here are some of the options and talking-points, if you will, I would use during discussions with Syria and Iran:

As part of an overall strategy, our first goal should be to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran whenever possible.  They are unnatural allies, together only due to their mutual hatred of Israel and the US and their support for Hezbollah.  Whenever possible they need to be separated and played off each other.

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, we need to articulate to both of them that if we lose in Iraq, we will make sure they lose as well.  What this boils down to is that we tell them in no uncertain terms that we will ensure instability in Iraq spills over to them to create security problems in their own countries.  We should even explain in basic terms how we would achieve this to ensure they get the point.  One obvious method, among others, is to supply arms and training to groups hostile to Iran and/or Syria.  The Kurds are good candidates because they represent large, discriminated, minority populations in both Iran and Syria.  One strategy is to make it plain that if the US is forced to withdraw from Iraq, we will adopt the Kurds as our proxy force, provide them weapons, training and logistics, and encourage them to act against their Syrian and Iranian oppressors.  In other words, the Kurds would become our Hezbollah.  Additionally, we could threaten to promote claims of Kurdish autonomy in those tribal areas.  Obviously great care and perhaps coordination would be necessary to ensure our ally Turkey is not threatened by these moves.

For Iran there are other options we could exercise.  First we could actively oppose Iranian claims in the disputed Caspian Sea not only through public support of Azerbaijan.  In coordination, we could give the Azerbaijani government the means to defend disputed oil fields from Iran by providing them with naval patrol craft and training.  Iran has, on a few occasions, chased away Azerbaijani vessels from these oil-rich disputed areas.

In the south, we could reopen discussion and throw our support behind the UAE in its long dispute with Iran over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands in the southern Persian Gulf.  UAE has long sought to have the dispute settled in the International Court of Justice in the Hague.  The US could add its voice to that call.

Additional options for Syria are somewhat more limited, but more active support to anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon is one.

In addition to negative coercive measures, some carrots should be added.  Arab and Persian cultures do not allow Iran and Syria to respond to or change from threats, so they will need something they can point to in order to preserve face.  The US must tread carefully here and not provide empty promises but at the same time not reward Iran and Syria without obtaining actual benefit.  Some of our arms negotiations with the Soviets could be used as a very rough model.  Those agreements relied on a series of mutually verified steps and agreements that worked toward a larger goal.

This is a fairly short list, and I’m sure there are other areas and methods we could use to coerce Iran and Syria.  At this point, at this late date, we must try, even from a position of perceived weakness, simply because it’s impossible to instill security in a country with weak government institutions if its neighbors don’t acquiesce.  I’m sympathetic to arguments against giving Iran and Syria the prestige associated with negotiations with the US, as well as those arguing the questionable morality of negotiating with such despotic governments, but when it comes right down to it, is it worth losing in Iraq to avoid those eventualities?  I think talks are worth the risk provided they are done privately and resemble the options I listed above.  Winning in Iraq would be worth the cost.

Comments

[Aaron]

Very interesting. Do you think we can actually stop the Iranians from getting nukes?

If no, then shouldn't we include that in our list of carrots, i.e. allow them to have their nuclear program?

[Andy]

Aaron,

Thanks for you comment. Sorry for the late reply, I've been out of town for the past few weeks.

I think if Iran really wants the nukes, it will be hard to stop them. It's difficult to tell if nukes are seen as a non-negotiable priority for them. Certainly it would require significant concessions on our part that we are not likely to offer.