Non Partisan Pundit

On the Obama - Wright Controversy

After reading various views on the topic I guess I'm more ambivalent about this whole thing than most.  The important thing for me is to ensure that Obama doesn't share Wright's views and in the final analysis, I don't think he does.  I agree with Dick Morris here:

Wright's rantings are not reflective of Obama's views on anything. Why did he stay in the church? Because he's a black Chicago politician who comes from a mixed marriage and went to Columbia and Harvard. Suspected of not being black enough or sufficiently tied to the minority community, he needed the networking opportunities Wright afforded him in his church to get elected. If he had not risen to the top of Chicago black politics, we would never have heard of him. But obviously, he can't say that. So what should he say?

And frankly, I'm tired of guilt-by-association politics. I'm reminded, actually, of the concept used to grant high-level security clearances in this country.  It uses a "whole person" concept that weighs positive and negative information to come to a judgment on an individual's character and trustworthiness.  I guess because of my background I tend to look at others and make similar calculations and Presidential candidates are no different.

I look at some of my lifelong friends and realize that if I were ever to run for office they would be political liabilities because I choose to associate with them despite their flaws.  On the whole, I believe they are good people.  I do not look at my associations with a zero defect mentality and I believe it's unreasonable for me to expect others to do the same with their's - and that includes Obama.

Halle-frickin'-lujah

The NRO is finally beginning to get put in its place:

Then the NRO's mongo-expensive Future Imagery Architecture spy satellite program turned into a $10 billion disaster.  And the orbiter known as NRO Launch 21 malfunctioned so badly, the U.S. military had to shoot it out of orbit.  Now, Space.com reports, "senior U.S. defense and intelligence leaders have stripped the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) of its authority to make key decisions on a planned imaging satellite procurement and are poised to do the same for others managed by the spy satellite agency."

In its infancy, the NRO was a great organization that did wonderful things for US intelligence.  That time is over and the organization has become a bloated bureaucratic intelligence funding black hole.  It's well past time to let the collection agencies manage their own satellite acquisitions and hopefully this will be the first step toward that end.

Nuclear Funny: "The Talk"

A  stranger was seated next to a little girl on the airplane when the stranger turned to her and said, "Let's talk. I've  heard that flights go quicker if you strike up a conversation with your fellow  passenger."

The  little girl, who had just opened  her book, closed it slowly and said to the stranger, "What would you like to talk about?"

"Oh, I don't know," said the stranger.  "How about nuclear power?" he said, smiling.

"OK," she said.  "That could be an interesting  topic. But let me ask a you a question first.  A horse, a cow, and a deer all eat the same stuff: grass. Yet a deer excretes little pellets, while a cow turns out a flat patty and a horse produces big clumps. Why do you suppose that is?"

The stranger, visibly surprised  by the little girl's intelligence, thinks about it and says, "Hmmm, I have  no idea."

To which the little girl replies, "Do you really feel qualified to discuss nuclear power when you don't even know shit?"

Stupid Advertisers

So I'm sitting here watching "We Were Soldiers Once and Young" on TNT in HD and the movie is at the part where the lines are overrun and the guy who just had a baby today gets hit with napalm by accident.  He's in his buddy's arms in severe pain and tells his friend (I think) to take care of his wife and new baby.  At that very moment, they cut to commercial for....a frickin' birth control pill.  WTF?  This isn't just any birth control pill but one that supposedly reduces "irritability."  So there are lots of shots with hot skinny women with big white smiles acting overly happy presumably because their periods and cramping are both light.  Let me tell you it did not reduce my irritability - quite the opposite.  I'm accustomed to commercial interruptions watching regular TV but com'on!

All I can say is that whoever the ad person was that bought that slot for that birth control pill should be frickin' fired.  If this were the USSR I'd order them to the gulag.

My New Addiction

A game called Trukz.  More fun that it first appears - check it out!

21st Century Nuclear Strategy

This post is my response to Cheryl's call for a "blog tank" on the topic of US Nuclear Strategy.  I am glad to contribute my rather quick and rough thoughts to the discussion of this important topic.  Others who have commented on the subject include Michael van der Galien, Dave Schuler, Shane Deichman and Jason Sigger (please let me know if I've missed anyone).

To begin with, I'd like to point out and discuss three important premises that I believe are critical:

1. Nuclear strategy is not isolated and is part of, and integral to, broader US strategy.  Although the concept of nuclear strategy as a mere portion of overall US strategy appears obvious and self-evident, debates on nuclear policy are still too often divorced from the "big picture" strategy debate.  It is my contention that nuclear policy differences among experts are those in the "blog tank" not primarily rooted in disputes over nuclear policy itself but represent disputes over broader US strategic policy and the role the US should and will play on the world stage in the 21st century.  Added to this mix is what "New World Order" the international system will morph into over the coming years and decades - a process which, in my view, is still ongoing.  Therefore, I would suggest the debate on US nuclear policy is really a debate on larger, more complex and highly-interrelated issues.

2. Related to the previous premise is my contention that the US lacks a coherent and defendable strategic vision or plan for the 21st century.  Without a coherent vision it becomes difficult to formulate coherent and integrated policies and nuclear policy is no exception.  The US appears to me divided and reticent after "winning" the cold war, unsure of where to go or what to do next beyond incrementalism and maintaining the status quo, particularly since interventionism is not working out so well.

3. Nuclear weapons cannot be 100% verifiably eliminated. The problem with eliminating nuclear weapons entirely is one of trust and verification.  For relatively new nuclear states, this is a difficult prospect, for the US, Russia, China, and others it is exceedingly difficult.  Ensuring that a country does not have a few weapons or material hidden away is virtually impossible given the nuclear history and accounting practices of many of these states.  Therefore, any agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons will require a relatively high degree of trust sans verification - a condition which states of all stripes will find difficult to accept.  This concern, however, can be partially addressed through limiting delivery platforms, as I'll discuss later.

With that said, I will briefly note my own views on the strategic big-picture to provide context for my specific comments on nuclear policy:

1. The US will continue to be a hegemonic economic, military and political power until at least mid-century and the US will likely continue to be more interventionist in its foreign policy than other nations.
2. International institutions and treaties born at the end of WWII will decline in importance and influence unless they are amended or reformed, particularly the UN itself and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  The principle reason is that both are discriminatory and the discrimination was based on conditions and a strategic situation that are no longer relevant or are rapidly becoming so.  For example, India's GDP will likely overtake that of France in the next decade and India is a nuclear power with a capable military.  Increasingly, nations like India are asking why they do not have veto power on the UNSC or the status and benefits as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT given their importance.  If the western powers want these institutions to remain relevant then they must be open to significant reform and address the concerns of the "have-nots," particularly the powerful ones.

Now that a foundation is laid, on to nuclear policy specifically, which I'll first summarize thusly:

1.  In strategically ambiguous circumstances, nations will hedge their bets.
2.  The utility of bilateral treaties is greatly diminished as is the importance of US - Russian arms control in general.
3.  Delivery systems are at least as important as nuclear weapons themselves and more effort should be placed on limiting them.

While acknowledging that the cold war is certainly over, I believe we remain in a period of strategic ambiguity as the world continues to change and reorganize away from the bipolar cold-war era toward one probably more fractious, contentious and chaotic in nature.  As this change takes place, it is difficult to predict with any certainty what future threats might develop, from what quarter they might come and how serious they might be.  In such an environment, nations and leaders are naturally hesistant and are more likely to err on the side of more capability than less - in other words, to hedge their bets.  In a nuclear context, this means that restricting one's capabilities unilaterally or through treaty is more difficult because doing so may a produce future vulnerability. For example, suppose the US and Russia signed a treaty to verifiably reduce their stockpiles to less than 100, but at some later date another power increased its stockpile significantly.  Let's assume this power was hostile to Russia but not to the US.  In this case, Russia would face a difficult strategic choice between adhering to a treaty with the US or breaking the treaty to increase its deterrent to meet the new threat.  The former might leave Russia vulnerable to the new power, the latter might reignite competition or even hostility with the US.  Rather than risk that or similar scenarios, it appears both the US and Russia intend to "hedge their bets" against future uncertainty by keeping more weapons than one might argue are rationally required for their strategic needs.  I hasten to add that I don't make this argument in order to advocate a "hedging bets" position - rather it is meant explain the general reluctance among nuclear weapon's states to push toward real disarmament and to set the stage for how it may be overcome.

The conundrum Russia faced in my example illustrates the limited utility of bilateral arms control agreements in a world that is no longer bipolar.  It is one reason why arms control objectives will be best met through multilateral agreements. The CTBT is an excellent example as it applies to all states - even those without nuclear weapons.  A similar global agreement might cap the number of weapons every nation could legally posses and provide a schedule of regular, verifiable reductions that would apply to everyone.

Additionally, nuclear policy, particularly with regard to weapons, cannot be assessed without examining delivery systems.  I would argue that too much emphasis is placed on weapons and not enough on the means to deliver them - primarily ballistic missiles.  Let's look at the US and Russia as examples.  Both nations have large numbers of warheads on alerted missiles that can strike virtually any target on the planet with impugnity in less than forty minutes.  If  those warheads were on bombers or tactical aircraft their threat would be significantly diminished simply because delivering the weapons would take much longer and the delivery platforms are much more vulnerable to interdiction.  Time is critically important here - the threat posed by the capability to deliver x number of warheads in under 30 minutes is orders of magnitude greater than that posed by the capability to deliver those same warheads in hours or even days, even if x were a single digit number.

This ties into the second premise I gave above - that nuclear weapons cannot be 100% verifiably eliminated.  The presence of ballistic missiles aggravates that verification difficulty because even a few weapons that a nation might hide are an imminent nuclear threat when mated to missiles.  In a crisis the potential for nuclear blackmail is huge.  If the delivery means were limited to aircraft or more unconventional methods then a few weapons are not nearly as great a threat because there is time and opportunity to intercept, destroy, capture, or otherwise prevent delivery to the target.

So, one way to provide a significant reduction to the threat posed by nuclear weapons is to limit or eliminate ballistic missiles. Furthermore, restriction or elimination of ballistic missiles (especially long-range missiles) is arguably easier from a verification standpoint than nuclear weapons since they are larger, more difficult to hide and require significant support facilities.  As a result, the US may get a greater security bang-for-the-buck by pursuing elimination of ballistic missiles than it would elimination of nuclear weapons.  Taken together, reducing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is reinforcing and should be pursued in concert.

These are only a few shallow thoughts on a deep subject with long-ranging consequences, but I hope readers will find something of value herein.

On Petraeus and Casualty Numbers

The numbers game with regard to Iraqi civilian casualties is frankly a mind-bending experience.

UPDATE:  Added numbers for Iraq Body Count to the Charts

UPDATE #2:  After adding the IBC numbers, I noticed something strange that perhaps makes Ilan's analysis slightly less compelling.  See the conclusion below.

Based on queuing from a fine gentleman over at Intel-dump, I took a look at an analysis by Ilan Goldenberg over at Democracy Arsenal.  I recreated his chart, though our numbers are slightly different because they are derived not from actual data, but extraction from separate excel charts.  To that chart, however, I added various civilian casualty numbers as reported by others so that all (or at least most) of the known data can be examined together. Here's the chart, with further explanation and clarification below (click for a larger image):

Here's the line-by-line details of what the numbers are and who reported them:

• MNF (+wounded):  These numbers are derived from the latest quarterly MNF report (see the chart on page 20).  Like Ilan, I estimated the daily average for the month (the green portion) and then multiplied that number by the number of days in the month to arrive at a monthly figure.  Obviously there is some imprecision involved, but I imported the chart into photoshop and laid down a grid to improve the estimation somewhat. The most important difference between these numbers and the others is that they are casualties and not just deaths.
• Petreaus:  These are numbers derived from General Petraeus' briefing slides for Congress.  Like the MNF portion, I don't have the raw numbers, but got a decent estimation based on the slide.
• Icasualties:  These are the hard-data numbers as reported by icasualties.org and taken directly off their website.
• GOI: These are numbers reported by the Government of Iraq, as reported through various media sources, primarily the Associated Press.  The GOI does not publish them directly, so some searching was required to obtain all the months through press reporting.  In some instances, I found minor discrepancies in the numbers - in those cases, I used the higher number.
• UN:  Until January 2007, the UN calculated civilian deaths by using GOI and other information.  However, in January the GOI stopped providing the UN this info and so the UN discontinued the production of such estimates.  As a result, there is no UN data for 2007, and therefore it doesn't directly reflect on the surge, but I include it anyway as a comparison to the 2006 data.  I pulled the UN numbers from Spencer Ackerman at TPM (along with some GOI numbers).
• IBC: These are compilations of the raw numbers from the Iraq Body Count incident database.  The database has two numbers because of conflicting or unclear reporting - a minimum and a maximum.  The numbers I use in the chart are the maximum figures.  The IBC numbers include police and Iraq soldiers.  I did not want to take the time to edit them out by hand so I left them in.

I will leave it to the reader to make sense of the spaghetti soup except to point out two things:

1. First I find it interesting that the data beginning in April of this year is surprising consistent, especially when compared to other time-frames. Not only do the peaks and valleys match, but they are also relatively close in terms of real numbers and match very closely in terms of variation from month-to-month.  The divergent graph is, naturally, the MNF numbers which included wounded.



2. Secondly, the circled area in the chart at right identifies the discrepancy that Ilan noted in his post between the  MNF and Petraeus numbers.  As the chart shows, for December and January, the MNF numbers for killed and wounded civilians are LESS than the Petraeus numbers for killed alone - a seemingly impossible conclusion given that  both sets of numbers are ostensibly derived from the same source (specifically, the MNF-I SIGACT database).  It's also interesting that the Petreaus numbers for December 2006 are higher than all the other reported figures for that month. UPDATE: After adding the IBC and UN data, I noticed that their reported number of deaths for December, are, like Petraeus' numbers, greater than the MNF numbers for both killed and wounded.  ISTM that might indicate that the MNF numbers, at least for December, are flawed, but one must keep in mind that precision and accuracy on civilian casualties tough to quantify.

Given that we don't know how the various numbers in the MNF report and Gen. Petraeus' charts were derived, the only comment I'll make is that the discrepancy should be explained and that it would be helpful if MNF-I was more transparent with it's data and methodology.  There are a few explanations for the discrepancy beyond "cooking the books" but  the current political atmosphere, intense scrutiny, and, more importantly, very real policy implications suggest to me, at least, that an explanation should be provided as well as a greater degree of transparency - even at the cost of releasing some marginally classified data.  As it stands, and unless I am missing something (as I am definitely NOT a statistician), the discrepancy clouds the issue and certainly provides ammunition for those accusing Petraeus of "cooking the books" even though it is not definitive proof.

Intelligence Studies: Analyzing the "Yes Men" Effect in Closed Regimes

This post is the first of what I hope to be many on topics regarding intelligence analysis.  It will likely appeal only to the most hardened intel geek, but hopefully laymen will find it interesting.  Without further adieu, the "yes men" effect:

The desire to limit or hide bad information from superiors is a natural human tendency.  In closed regimes, however, it often becomes standard operating procedure.  Despots historically do not take bad news well, especially when it reflects poorly on them personally, and are prone to “kill the messenger.”  As a result, over time, authoritarian regimes can develop a “Yes Man” mentality around the principal leader or leaders as underlings attempt to avoid the very real and sometimes deadly consequences of failure or delivering bad news.  This is a condition endemic in closed and authoritarian regimes and generally increases in intensity with the level of paranoia and despotism by the leadership.

Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler are two parallel examples that demonstrate the principle.  As each became more paranoid and delusional over time, they also became increasingly unfriendly to bad news and sound contrary viewpoints and advice.  Their psychology of individual superiority combined with a growing reluctance by advisors to give honest advice had the effect of heightening the perception of their own intellectual and analytical superiority.   As time passed, both Saddam and Hitler increasingly believed that everyone around them was ignorant and stupid.  This effect was continually reinforced by the collective effects of growing personal isolation and the bevy of “yes men” and sycophants who either curried favor or were rightly afraid to question their leader’s judgment. The result for Hitler and Saddam was that near the end of their regimes, little truthful reporting made it to their ears and most of their decisions were made based using their own flawed self-importance and equally flawed information.  For Saddam’s regime it got to the point where the leadership believed the completely and comically  bogus reporting of their own Information Minister, nicknamed “Baghdad Bob.” (Yes, it's hard to believe, but true.  Not until US tanks rolled through Baghdad did the reality of the situation finally dawn on Saddam and his close advisers.)  Stalin was similarly handicapped, but was wise enough to leave most operational military matters to professional Generals after many poor decisions following the German invasion in 1941.  Both Stalin and Saddam forbade their intelligence functions from providing foreign political analysis because they felt, as political leaders, they were the "experts" and therefore more qualified to judge political matters.  However a combination of inaccurate regime reporting, ignorance of other political leaders, and paranoia-infused cognitive bias ensured that both would horribly miscalculate the intent of foreign political leaders.

The “Yes Man” phenomenon presents interesting challenges to intelligence evaluation and analysis.  The degree to which information flow in a closed regime is affected by dishonest reporting must be considered when evaluating intelligence – particularly intelligence that is contradictory.  Communications and Human intelligence are particularly susceptible to spurious data from dishonest reporting because they can directly tap the information flow within a regime. As a result, the accuracy of information from such direct access must be carefully evaluated to determine not only the validity of the information, but also the extent and scope of reporting dishonesty. 
With a robust collection plan, it’s possible to validate direct access intelligence by comparing it to other collected intelligence.  For example, if a communication intercept for a fighter wing reports a certain level of readiness or the completion of operational activities, that information can be verified with other sources such as imagery.  If the communications intercept conflicted with other sources, then that could be an indication that lower echelons are purposely lying to the upper echelons of the regime. A downside to this kind of analysis is that close coordination between different collection assets and methods is necessary to provide analysts with sufficient data to make an accurate analytical judgment.  Analysts and collection managers will have to prioritize and coordinate collection with the specific goal of obtaining regime reporting, ideally at multiple levels of the hierarchy, and comparing it with other intelligence collected for the purpose of evaluating regime reporting.  However, the amount of collection resources required to provide the necessary data may be unrealistic in light of competing requirements and the very real limitations of collecting against closed regimes.  If the necessary collection cannot be supported, then analysts should view direct access intelligence data with additional skepticism if it originates in a closed or authoritarian regime.

Another potential problem is identifying where in the chain-of-command the dishonest reporting occurs.  Identification and analysis of the phenomenon will be easier if dishonesty is endemic at all levels or echelons since there are more opportunities for US assets to collect the report as it flows up the heirachy.  If regime reporting is largely accurate until the information hits the regime’s inner circle, then the phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine because of fewer collection opportunities.

Knowledge of reporting accuracy in a regime has many implications for policy and decision-makers.  Using Saddam as an example, a regime leader may believe that his military is more powerful than it truly is, which could affect his calculus for going to war or confronting the United States.  Readiness reports that reached Saddam were never accurate and overstated Iraqi military capabilities.  When combined with Saddam's delusions about the inherent superiority of Arab fighters, among others, he grossly overestimated Iraq's military strength prior to OIF. 

Knowledge of the existence and extent of the "yes man" phenomenon inside a regime affords opportunities for exploitation through psychological and information operations which could serve to manipulate the regime or destabilize it.  Most important, however, is that analysts and policymakers would be better able to determine assumptions the insulated regime leadership use to make critical decisions - hopefully resulting in better predictive analysis.

Accurate analysis of closed regimes is critical for US strategic warning and foreign policy.  Many historic strategic warning failures have at least some roots in the failure to appreciate information flow within and reporting within a regime.  Successful mitigation of adversaries like North Korea, Iran, Syria and a host of other authoritarian regimes will be impossible unless analysts understand internal regime decision processes, which are directly influenced by regime reporting.  The effects of miscalculations are potentially monumental if history is used as a guide.  All analysts should view direct access intelligence data with additional skepticism and advocate for additional collection resources to validate it.  Otherwise, the United States will likely make significant strategic mistakes when dealing with closed regimes in the future.

Neighborhood Containment - A Security Strategy for Iraq

This post is in response to Dave Shuler’s Blogging Colloquium on “Directions for Iraq.”  I’m honored to participate in a creative, open-minded and, most of all, reasoned discussion of options on Iraq.

I will begin with a short synopsis of my credentials.  I served as an intelligence analyst with the US Navy and Air force for over 15 years.  During that time I had a broad range of experience, mostly concentrated on the Persian-Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean littoral. My primary expertise was in support to military planning and conventional and unconventional threat analysis.

The problems and potential solutions to the current mess in Iraq are certainly complex and immense in scope.  To start with, I’ll outline the broad strategy I believe will lead to success.  For the purposes of this post and discussion, I will call it the “Neighborhood Containment” (NC) strategy.  It’s rooted in established counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, so most, if not all, the ideas I present here are not new.  I’m simply packaging a strategy based on COIN doctrine tailored to present-day Iraq. 

Interestingly, the US Army and Marine Corp just published a new manual for US Military COIN doctrine (13mb PDF). I haven’t read the entire 282 page document yet (I did read the draft published over the summer), but a quick examination confirms that the US military is not following many COIN principles listed in the manual and is making notable and identifiable mistakes in Iraq by applying conventional military thinking to an unconventional insurgent war.  I highly recommend everyone reading this post at least read the forward and introduction.  I may write an analytical post comparing our current operations with those laid out in the COIN manual in the future.

Before my specific prescription I think it’s important to identify some of the assumptions that underlie my reasoning.  I’ll say at the start that these assumptions are not without controversy and certainly are not secure from intellectual attack. Here they are in rough order of importance:

1. The ultimate solution to the discord in Iraq is a political solution, not a military one.  However, in the current environment, a political solution is not possible until security is improved.  I place security over other factors, such as political freedom and economics based, in part, on Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.  Although somewhat flawed and representing western cultural bias, Maslow’s theory, I believe, shows personal security from violence as the preeminent need of the average Iraqi.
2. A political solution that keeps Iraq intact requires the Iraqi government hold the loyalty of a majority of the population.
3. The neighborhood containment strategy must (and hopefully would) be part of a larger, coordinated, and comprehensive COIN strategy.  COIN, when done correctly, is probably the most complex and multidisciplinary form of warfare that exists.  As a corollary, policy makers must understand the basic limitations of US military forces (particularly conventional) in a COIN environment.  In my estimation, a majority of Congressional Representatives and Senators along with key leaders in the Executive (along with a majority of the public) are ignorant of these limitations.  Sadly, many in the military are as well.
4. Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict, a civil war, and/or partition of Iraq is not inevitable.
5. There are no quick solutions – the effort will require perhaps a decade or two of significant US involvement. However, this does not necessarily mean significant US military involvement for the entire period.

The basic idea behind the Neighborhood Containment strategy is to grow security in Iraq in pieces and phases at the local level, one neighborhood at a time.  To date, policy makers and the military have concentrated on the “hot spot” du jour by moving forces around in what many have derided as a “whack-a-mole” COIN strategy.  More recently, some have begun to advocate a “clear and hold” strategy which is similar to, but shallower, than my NC strategy.  NC is a phased strategy:

Phase I – Identification: NC starts with identifying a neighborhood based on geographic, cultural, ethnic, tribal and/or sectarian boundaries and conditions, among other factors.

Phase  II – Isolation: Once a candidate neighborhood is identified, the next phase uses US and Iraqi forces to isolate it from the rest of the country.  Initially, US forces with Iraqis embedded would conduct the cordon, establish checkpoints and maintain security around the perimeter.  Once accomplished, additional US and Iraqi forces would conduct aggressive patrolling in the zone to establish security, root out insurgents, and begin developing intelligence networks to uncover hidden insurgent cells.  As much as practicable, operations should have an Iraqi face, and, as the neighborhood is pacified over time, control should be transitioned completely over to Iraqi forces.  Isolation is particularly important because it limits insurgent resupply, movement and the ability to conduct attacks.

Phase III – Essential Services and Population Control: Once a basic level of security is achieved (it’s important to note that complete security will take time and won't be fully achieved until phase V), then Iraqi government agencies, most likely assisted by international organizations and NGO’s, will move in to establish essential services.  Again, as much as possible, these operations should have an Iraqi face to garner popular support for the government.  Concurrently, the Iraqi government would conduct a census and residents would be required to obtain a new, forge-proof national identification card (the current card is inadequate and easily forged).  This new ID is another measure to limit insurgent movement and resupply by monitoring and controlling movement into and out of the neighborhood zone.

Phase IV – Increase Government control:  Depending upon circumstances and the depth of insurgent activity in the neighborhood, this phase could last anywhere from perhaps a year to a decade.  During this phase, the Iraqi government moves to establish complete control of the zone by expanding beyond basic needs and essential services.  Most importantly, a viable police force is trained, equipped and deployed to maintain everyday security.  Ideally the force would be drawn from vetted residents of the neighborhood.  As the police force establishes control, coalition and federal Iraqi forces would gradually withdraw. Additionally, perimeter security would be gradually eased to adjoining neighborhoods which are in stage IV or V, but would be maintained between any neighborhoods not yet part of the NC program.

Phase V – Return to Normalcy: This phase represents the end of the insurgency in the neighborhood as a serious threat and the return of normalcy in everyday life. Any remaining coalition or Iraqi federal forces would be withdrawn and the security perimeter would be disestablished between other Phase V neighborhoods.

That’s the plan in a nutshell. The concept has several advantages:

First, if the program demonstrates success with the initial “proof of concept” neighborhoods, then others would likely want to join the program.  Not only does this grant internal legitimacy to the Iraqi government, but it also puts it at an advantage since it can decide which neighborhoods would join the program next thereby giving it a measure of negotiating power with local leaders.  People will gradually demand to join the program because of its security and essential service benefits and they will pressure their local leaders to negotiate and join the government fold.  Reliable electricity, water and other critical services would be a powerful inducement to the average Iraqi, to say nothing of improved security.

Secondly, it will limit insurgent activity, movement and operational freedom through tight control of the population.  Additionally, success will negate insurgent propaganda (our media operations currently suck compared to the insurgent) as more neighborhoods join and expand.  The hard-core insurgent areas will increasingly be physically, politically, economically, and socially isolated.

Thirdly, the plan makes success easier by scaling down operations to manageable level.  For three years now, the US has tried a national haphazard approach that overreached and failed.  In many ways, it resembled the old military axiom, “If you try to defend everything, you end up defending nothing.”  Concentrating on small areas first, then scaling and expanding the operation is a smarter way to go for a whole host of reasons.

Of course, there are downsides.  One is that US Forces will have to be more engaged, and therefore more vulnerable – particularly during the initial stages.  Overcoming the current force-protection “fobbit” attitude of commanders will be difficult.  Additionally, many US forces will require additional training prior to deployment, primarily in COIN operations.  Although US forces have improved a lot over the past several years, the conventional forces still largely approach the insurgent problem with conventional attitudes and tactics. There are, I’m sure, many other problems and potential pitfalls with this strategy, but I will leave those to critics to detail.

Finally, I'll post a few excellent links on COIN and Iraq:

• "Winning Wars" by a recently retired Colonel (pdf).
• "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency" by an NPS professor (pdf).
• "In a Volatile Region in Iraq, the US Military Takes Two Paths" Excellent WAPO article demonstrating conventional vs unconventional COIN operations.

How to Talk to Iran and Syria

Much poo-poo has been made about the recent ISG report that gives so-called “expert” recommendations on what to do next in Iraq.  The quality of the recommendations vary widely, in my view.  Undoubtedly the most controversial is the recommendation to engage Syria and Iran in talks to somehow get their help in securing Iraq.  Rick Moran and many other notable bloggers on the right have roundly, and not without justification, criticized talks with those two despotic regimes.  However, talks could be productive, even if they only serve to make a few things clear to Iran and Syria and ensure they know our position.  Public diplomacy is often misinterpreted, so private talks will always have value in dispelling misperception by the other side.

In a perfect world I would have preferred engaging Iran and Syria much earlier - right after Baghdad fell in 2003.  Negotiations with Iran and Syria at that time would have given us comparative strength, especially considering we had already engaged Iran similarly after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Syria numerous times including the First Gulf War.  Now, however, Iran and Syria perceive the US position as considerably weakened and they would be hard-pressed to accede to any US demands even though neither country desires civil war and an unstable neighbor in Iraq.  There is still room, however, for influence and I believe that laying some of our cards out on the table for Syria and particularly Iran to ponder would probably be beneficial to us in the long run.

In order to effectively convince Iran and Syria to, at the very least, not interfere in Iraq, they must be convinced that it’s in their interest.  To achieve that, we need to show Syria and Iran what consequences they would face should the US fail in Iraq due to their malfeasance. 

To start off with, I would not make idle threats about invasion or airstrikes or direct military action against Iran or Syria.  Both of these countries know that such threats are largely hollow.  Our leaders are, I trust, wise enough to know that Iraq is not worth starting a large regional war over unless there is a clear and unmitigated cassis belli.  Syria and Iran are both smart enough to not cross that line.  With that said, here are some of the options and talking-points, if you will, I would use during discussions with Syria and Iran:

As part of an overall strategy, our first goal should be to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran whenever possible.  They are unnatural allies, together only due to their mutual hatred of Israel and the US and their support for Hezbollah.  Whenever possible they need to be separated and played off each other.

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, we need to articulate to both of them that if we lose in Iraq, we will make sure they lose as well.  What this boils down to is that we tell them in no uncertain terms that we will ensure instability in Iraq spills over to them to create security problems in their own countries.  We should even explain in basic terms how we would achieve this to ensure they get the point.  One obvious method, among others, is to supply arms and training to groups hostile to Iran and/or Syria.  The Kurds are good candidates because they represent large, discriminated, minority populations in both Iran and Syria.  One strategy is to make it plain that if the US is forced to withdraw from Iraq, we will adopt the Kurds as our proxy force, provide them weapons, training and logistics, and encourage them to act against their Syrian and Iranian oppressors.  In other words, the Kurds would become our Hezbollah.  Additionally, we could threaten to promote claims of Kurdish autonomy in those tribal areas.  Obviously great care and perhaps coordination would be necessary to ensure our ally Turkey is not threatened by these moves.

For Iran there are other options we could exercise.  First we could actively oppose Iranian claims in the disputed Caspian Sea not only through public support of Azerbaijan.  In coordination, we could give the Azerbaijani government the means to defend disputed oil fields from Iran by providing them with naval patrol craft and training.  Iran has, on a few occasions, chased away Azerbaijani vessels from these oil-rich disputed areas.

In the south, we could reopen discussion and throw our support behind the UAE in its long dispute with Iran over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands in the southern Persian Gulf.  UAE has long sought to have the dispute settled in the International Court of Justice in the Hague.  The US could add its voice to that call.

Additional options for Syria are somewhat more limited, but more active support to anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon is one.

In addition to negative coercive measures, some carrots should be added.  Arab and Persian cultures do not allow Iran and Syria to respond to or change from threats, so they will need something they can point to in order to preserve face.  The US must tread carefully here and not provide empty promises but at the same time not reward Iran and Syria without obtaining actual benefit.  Some of our arms negotiations with the Soviets could be used as a very rough model.  Those agreements relied on a series of mutually verified steps and agreements that worked toward a larger goal.

This is a fairly short list, and I’m sure there are other areas and methods we could use to coerce Iran and Syria.  At this point, at this late date, we must try, even from a position of perceived weakness, simply because it’s impossible to instill security in a country with weak government institutions if its neighbors don’t acquiesce.  I’m sympathetic to arguments against giving Iran and Syria the prestige associated with negotiations with the US, as well as those arguing the questionable morality of negotiating with such despotic governments, but when it comes right down to it, is it worth losing in Iraq to avoid those eventualities?  I think talks are worth the risk provided they are done privately and resemble the options I listed above.  Winning in Iraq would be worth the cost.